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M. he real state therefore is one that is in
continuous oscillation around a central
equilibrium point, which itself is in motion.
Pareto
Ask the average intelligent observer of
economic matters to define a business
cycle and chances are good that you
will receive an explanation along the
following lines: Advanced economies
are characterized by long-run trends in
the level of gross domestic product
(GDP) that can be predicted with virtual
certainty.' However, the actual path of
output is not smooth. GDP will some-
times be above its trend level, and some-
times below. It is this "cycling" around
the long-run trend that defines the periods
of contraction and expansion that consti-
tute the business cycle.
Though intuitive, this view oversimpli-
fies the actual method of measuring turn-
ing points in business activity employed
by the official arbiter of business cycles,
the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search (NBER). Following the pioneering
work of former Federal Reserve Chair-
man Arthur Burns and economist Wesley
C. Mitchell, the NBER defines peaks and
troughs of business activity as contrac-
tions and expansions in "aggregate eco-
nomic activity," as captured by a collec-
tion of economic data. In Mitchell's
words: "...a cycle consists of expansions
occurring about the same time in many
economic activities, followed by similarly
general recessions, contractions, and
revivals which merge into the expansion
phase of the next cycle" [emphasis
added].
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This is a distinction with a difference.
The narrow vantage point of cyclical ac-
tivity as a sequence of transitory devia-
tions of GDP from a relatively stable
trend—which we will for simplicity refer
to as the "conventional view" of business
cycles—leads naturally to the presump-
tion that the economy does not function
properly in the short run. Indeed, this
view practically invites the common be-
lief that economic swings reflect some
breakdown of the invisible hand that is
supposed to direct markets, whether as a
result of price or wage inflexibility, of
misperceived price signals arising from
volatile and uncertain monetary policy, or
of imperfections in credit markets. This
interpretation of business fluctuations also
invites the perspective that monetary pol-
icy plays a central role in the generation
of the business cycle.
The inevitability of this world view is
substantially undermined once cyclical
fluctuations are perceived as contractions
and expansions that are "occurring about
the same time in many economic activi-
ties." To think of business activity as a
collection of stylized facts concerning the
comovements of all economic variables
is to conceive of an organic economic
universe in a process of continuous
adjustment, where each piece is a part
of larger, sensible whole. Fluctuations
in such a universe could indeed reflect
the temporary breakdown of market
mechanisms along an otherwise smooth
and predictable trajectory. But equally
plausible is the possibility that the
economy's trajectory shifts frequently
and that economic aggregates move
In examining current conditions, we
should look beyond the conventional
view of business cycles to see that per-
manent, structural change may be
largely responsible for the recovery's
sluggishness. In fact, structural adjust-
ment seems to be an important compo-
nent of all economic fluctuations. What
distinguishes the current economy is the
lack of a typically "cyclical" element
together in consistent fashion, in both
the short and long run, precisely be-
cause markets are working.
To entertain this possibility is to interpret
economic fluctuations first as the result
of a market equilibrium in which the par-
ticipants exhaust all mutually advanta-
geous gains from trade. We argue that this
approach provides a useful framework for
understanding the supposedly aberrant
behavior of the economy in recent years.
We contend that recent phases of the U.S.
business cycle reflect not so much a fail-
ure of the marketplace as a fundamental
change in the economy's structure. Con-
sequently, we reject the notion that our
slow recovery stems from inadequate
aggregate demand that can be remedied
by expansionary monetary or fiscal poli-
cies. In fact, the current economic climate
is not distinguished by an unusual amount
of structural change; such adjustments
are common in economic fluctuations.
Rather, it is the absence of a cyclical, or
temporary, component in the economy's
recent downturn that is uncommon.
ISSN 0428-1276• The Conventional View and the
Conundrum of Cycle vs. Trend
The difference between cyclical and
structural movements in the economy in-
volves an important, though subtle, dis-
tinction. As the term is generally used, a
cyclical movement is a deviation from
economic equilibrium, back to which the
economy will ultimately "recover." Struc-
tural or trend movements, on the other
hand, are motivated by a change in the
economy's potential and are reflected by
a reallocation in the economy's resources.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to differen-
tiate, empirically or theoretically, between
cyclical and structural movements with-
out a complete model of the economy. If
we cannot locate the economy's poten-
tial, we can never clearly separate oscilla-
tions around the trend from movements
of the trend. Typically, structural changes
are assumed to be gradual, long-term
phenomena that can be reasonably repre-
sented by a smooth, long-term growth
trend. In the conventional view, cyclical
movements can be seen as the variations
around that trend (see figure 1).
The role of the government in such a
world is clear—to minimize the econo-
my's fluctuations around trend through
the use of well-timed countercyclical
fiscal and monetary actions. In the case
of monetary policy, the Federal Reserve
System is called upon to lower interest
rates when the economy is operating
below its potential, and later to increase
rates to offset any growing inflationary
pressure when the economy rises above
its potential.
According to the conventional view, the
economy has been operating below its
potential since late 1989, suggesting that
the central bank should be actively pursu-
ing policies aimed at accelerating growth.
Indeed, the Federal Reserve has reduced
money market interest rates by roughly
400 basis points during the past 20
months. Although there were accessory
considerations, such as below-target
monetary expansion, the economy's slug-
gish performance was certainly the prin-
cipal motive for these interest-rate cuts.
Similarly, both Congress and the ad-
ministration are actively espousing the
implementation of tax cuts specifically
designed to stimulate economic growth.
But the role of economic policy in the case
of structural adjustments is much less
clear. If the economy is in transit from the
old equilibrium to a new one, attempts to
alter its course will only frustrate and pro-
long the transition.
• Beyond the Stable Trend
Although few, if any, economists take lit-
erally the view that the long-run trend of
the economy is completely predictable, a
common presumption is still that the econ-
omy's trend changes only slowly over
time. Thus, for example, the trend line that
represents potential output in figure 1 im-
plies that only 1 percent of the variance in
real quarterly GDP growth is accounted
for by fluctuations resulting from struc-
tural changes that affect trend. In a 1982
paper, economists Charles R. Nelson and
Charles I. Plosser issued an important and
far-reaching challenge to standard think-
ing on the dichotomy between the cyclical
and trend phenomena that underlie figure
1. The thrust of their article was that, as
a statistical matter, most macroeconomic
variables (including total output) are not
well described as fluctuations around a
constant trend. Rather, they argued, macro-
economic variables are best seen as re-
sponding to a variety of shocks, some of
which permanently affect the levels of
those variables and some of which have
only transitory effects. The Nelson-Plosser
view implies that the GDP trend is not
smooth or slowly changing over time, but
is itself random, fluctuating constantly in
response to structural shocks such as oil
shortages, droughts, and changes in tech-
nology—events that permanently change
the economy's long-run equilibrium.
This article provided the impetus for a
good deal of research aimed at disen-
tangling the permanent and transitory
components of economic fluctuations.
Various studies now estimate that the
contribution of trend changes to the
quarterly variance in national output
ranges from 27 to 72 percent.
4 Stated
plainly, changes in the economy's trend
may account for a large share, if not
most, of its quarter-to-quarter fluctuations.
These conclusions are, of course, condi-
tioned on the economic model and econ-
ometric assumptions that underlie each
FIGURE 1 THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW
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particular study. But even in the most
conservative case, the contribution of
permanent, structural effects to quar-
terly economic swings far exceeds that
implied by the conventional view.
• The Equilibrium View
of Economic Fluctuations
The evidence presented by Nelson and
Plosser reinforced an idea that had al-
ready gained considerable influence by
1982—that economic fluctuations in
general could be understood as equilib-
rium outcomes. By the late 1970s, this
idea had been designated as "New
Classical" theory, although "equilibrium
business cycle" theory more accurately
describes its essence. The seminal work
during this period was still rooted firmly
in conventional business-cycle theory, in
that aggregate demand shocks—namely,
misperceived changes in the money sup-
ply—remained a key force driving cycli-
cal fluctuations.
A significant shift in the emphasis of equi-
librium business-cycle models occurred in
the early 1980s. In place of the presump-
tion that monetary policy changes were
the underlying cause of cyclical variations
came the suggestion that real shocks to
the economy were an important, and per-
haps the primary, agent of such fluctua-
tions. Because of the emphasis on real
shocks, this variant of the equilibrium
business-cycle approach became known
as real business cycle theory. This per-
spective introduced the possibility thatFIGURE 2 CYCLICAL AND STRUCTURAL JOB LOSS
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the very same factors at work in deter-
mining the economy's potential could
help to explain short-run fluctuations.
Consider, for example, a change in tax
policy that reduces incentives to save and
to accumulate capital. Although we
might expect the economy to return even-
tually to its pre-policy rate of growth in
the absence of other shocks, we would
also expect the amount of capital in the
economy, and hence the level of output
and consumption, to be permanently
lower than that which would have been
realized under the old taxation rules.
Additionally, changes in wages, interest
rates, and output would exert important
influences on the near-term behavior of
households and firms as the economy
made the transition to its new long-run
equilibrium. Thus, tax policy would not
only affect the long-run state of the econ-
omy, but it would also cause business
activity to exhibit short-run fluctuations
as the adjustment to that state unfolded.
The innovation of the real business cycle
approach was the demonstration that
cyclical phenomena could be replicated
quite well as the equilibrium outcomes of
generic shocks to the productivity of capi-
tal and labor. This perspective does not re-
quire that money is literally neutral, that
factor mobility is frictionless, that infor-
mation is perfect, or any of the other ex-
treme assumptions of which real business
cycle theorists are sometimes accused.
Indeed, it is likely (in our view) that one
or more of these complications are
necessary to explain cyclical patterns
in at least some macroeconomic vari-
ables. But real business cycle models,
along with the empirical observations
of Nelson and Plosser, invite us to re-
turn to our notion of short- and long-
run economic activity as a sequence of
equilibrium outcomes that is intelligi-
ble by the application of our cumulated
knowledge of how households and firms
respond to an ever-changing environment.
This, we believe, is the necessary context
in which to understand the U.S. economy
in 1992.
• The Slow Recovery:
A Case for a Structural Explanation
Despite recent monetary policy actions,
the economy has not responded with
any potency. Although we might make
the standard appeal to "long and vari-
able lags" of monetary policy effects,
we believe that the sluggishness of the
current recovery reflects a more fun-
damental shift in the economy that may
not be easily addressed using the stan-
dard monetary/fiscal incentives.
7 This
perspective was described in the 1992
Economic Report of the President:
Our recent economic problems are a re-
minder that even a well-functioning
economy faces the risk of temporary set-
backs from external shocks or other dis-
turbances. Market economies, such as
the United States, are continually
restructuring in response to technologi-
cal changes and external events, (p. 3)
The existence of a large, ongoing struc-
tural adjustment is suggested by recent
patterns of economic expansion. The
economy was growing substantially be-
low average for several years prior to
the 1990-91 recession and has contin-
ued on a sub-par pace for almost a year
following its trough. In fact, business
analysts agree almost uniformly that
the factors responsible for the latest
downturn were in place well before the
recession began, and are continuing to
restrain our rate of expansion today.
We can gauge the amount of structural
change in the economy more directly by
examining patterns in unemployment
data (figure 2). Since the recession offi-
cially began in July 1990, there has been
a sharp rise in the unemployment rate re-
sulting from jobs lost, a pattern that is
characteristic of all recent recessions.
However, unlike the case in previous
downturns, virtually all of the job loss
during the latest recession resulted from
permanent (structural) separations, rather
than from temporary (cyclical) layoffs.
In fact, the pattern of structural job loss is
not the uncommon feature of the recent
rise in joblessness. Increases in permanent
separations have occurred in roughly the
same magnitude in every recession of the
past 25 years, suggesting that structural
change has been an important element in
each of the past five downturns.
8 Rather,
it is the absence of a rise in cyclical lay-
offs during the latest recession that is un-
usual from a historical perpective. That
is, our current economic landscape is
almost entirely the product of permanent,
structural change.
• Conclusion
We can readily identify factors that have
spurred significant structural adjust-
ments in the U.S. economy. Again, as
stated in the 1992 Economic Report of
the President,
The American economy experienced an
unusual confluence of such imbalances in
recent years, for example in the financial
and real estate sectors, and in household,
corporate, and governmental debt. At the
same time, a major reallocation of re-
sources from defense to other sectors has
been under way. (p. 3)To these we would add the imbalances
that resulted from government policies
such as the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and
regulatory changes in the financial sector
—reforms that policymakers hope will
ultimately result in a stronger, more effi-
cient economy.
That fluctuations associated with struc-
tural adjustment should accelerate in
designated recessionary episodes is not
surprising in a historical context: There
appears to be a rather strong relationship
between temporary layoffs and permanent
job loss. Specifically, changes in cyclical
layoffs generally precede changes in per-
manent separations for periods of up to
seven months.
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Unlike the gradual, almost plodding,
description of the economy's potential
provided by conventional economic
theory, the message indicated by the
timing of permanent separations and
temporary layoffs is that a dispropor-
tionate share of structural adjustment
occurs when the economy is in a period
of recession. Thus, while it may be that
structural imbalances accumulate grad-
ually over time, structural change may
take place over relatively short intervals.
This description seems particularly apt as
we contemplate the current state of the
U.S. economy.
• Footnotes
1. Our well-informed average intelligent ob-
server knows that referring to gross national
product—which differs from GDP by the
addition of output produced beyond domestic
borders—is hopelessly passe.
2. See Wesley C. Mitchell, Business Cycles:
The Problem and Its Setting. New York: Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 1927.
3. See Charles R. Nelson and Charles I.
Plosser, "Trends and Random Walks in Macro-
economic Time Series: Some Evidence and Im-
plications," Journal of Monetary Economics,
vol. 10, no. 2 (September 1982), pp. 139-62.
4. For an accessible review of this research,
see John Boschen and Leonard Mills, "Mone-
tary Policy with a New View of Potential
GNR" Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
Business Review, July/August 1990, pp. 3-10.
5. A growing number of economists subscribe
to the view that real shocks of this sort will per-
manently change the growth rate of the econ-
omy. For a particularly readable explanation of
this view, see "Economic Growth: Explaining
the Mystery," The Economist, January 4, 1992,
pp. 15-18.
6. In this respect, the "real business cycle"
nomenclature is somewhat unfortunate. To be
accurate, real business cycle models are equi-
librium variants of the quantitative-theoretic
modeling approach, a description of which is
given in Edward C. Prescott, "Theory Ahead
of Business Cycle Measurement," Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Quarterly
Review, vol. 10, no. 4 (Fall 1986), pp. 9-22.
The importance of money as a causal factor in
cyclical fluctuations is not an assumption of
this approach, but rather an object of investiga-
tion. On this issue, see Finn E. Kydland, "The
Role of Money in a Business Cycle Model,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, In-
stitute for Empirical Macroeconomics, Dis-
cussion Paper 23, December 1989.
7. Although we profess to be in recovery, the
NBER has not yet officially designated the
dates of our most recent recession. In fact, it is
common to hear claims that the recession has
not yet ended. By most accounts, however, the
trough of the last cyclical downturn occurred
sometime in the second quarter of 1991, and
we make this assumption here.
8. For a detailed discussion, see Robert W.
Bednarzik, "Layoffs and Permanent Job
Losses: Workers' Traits and Cyclical Pat-
terns," Monthly Labor Review, September
1983, pp. 3-12.
9. This estimate comes from examining the
cross-correlations of temporary and perma-
nent layoff changes from February 1967 to
February 1992.
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